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Introduction 
 
Quality Bus Partnerships (QBPs) are defined as an agreement (either formal or 
informal) between one or more local authorities and one or more bus operators for 
measures to be taken up by more than one party to enhance bus services in a defined 
area. (TAS, 1997). They arise from the fact that no single organisation has control 
over all of the factors that govern the quality of supply of bus services. Partnerships 
between the relevant agents are therefore seen as a way to overcome this problem. 
Typically they involve the local authority providing traffic-management schemes that 
assist bus services, while the bus operator offers better quality is various dimensions. 
 
By definition, the introduction of a QBP will alter the quality of bus service provided. 
This is likely to have implications for passenger demand and the cost of operations, 
which in turn will influence the degree and type of competition between operators. It 
is the aim of this paper to provide a framework to determine the effect that QBPs may 
have on the structure of the bus market. To this end, we have developed a bus 
operations model capable of forecasting the outcome of different competitive 
situations and in particular the effect of Quality Partnerships on market structure and 
performance. 
 
Crucial is the need to be able to model the effects at corridor level, understanding the 
dynamics of competition. Therefore the main modelling effort has been at the corridor 
level.  We have worked on the assumption that there exist well-defined corridors 
which form the basis for operator strategies, which might be profit centres for 
operators, and which may be the subject of QBP arrangements.  Although clearly not 
picking up all QBPs, this is a realistic description of many. 
 
In terms of what the model actually does, it has been designed to answer the 
following questions: 
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• is the QBP likely to generate benefits (for users, operators, other road users, 
society at large);   
• is the QBP needlessly restrictive; 
• under what circumstances may a QBP eliminate competition; 
• will a good share of the benefits accrue to consumers?  
 
The parameters within the model can be set flexibly enough to be capable of dealing 
with various levels of spatial interaction and competition between routes. Model 
outcomes are determined by  
 
• the relevant values and elasticities on walk, wait, in-vehicle time, comfort and 
fare, some of which are known with more confidence than others; 
•  costs related to distance, time and peak vehicles required;   
• cost differences between operators; 
• the relevant fare and service strategies adopted by operators. 
• inter-operator elasticities. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we outline the workings of the model; examine the 
derivation of theoretically consistent demand elasticities; and demonstrate the 
usefulness of the model in a case study. 
 
Model structure 
 
We have developed a model structure that is simple but flexible enough to deal with a 
variety of QBP arrangements. Working on the assumption that there exist well-
defined corridors that form the basis for operator strategies the model consists of a 
series of n zones, with j parallel bus routes running through each zone. Demand for 
travel between any two zones in the network is then allocated to available individual 
services (e.g. the 0704 departure from zone 2 on route 1) according to the sensitivity 
of demand to the generalised cost of travel and the socio-economic characteristics of 
the travellers. Although clearly not picking up all QBPs, this network specification is 
a realistic description of many QBP arrangements and can be used to examine 
competition between QBP and non-QBP operators on the same or parallel routes. 
 
The temporal aspects of the model are constrained, by and large, by the availability of 
base input data. For example, if data on base demand levels is only available as daily 
totals there is little point in trying to successfully model the spread of traffic 
throughout the day. We have set the default timescale for the model to be a 
representative one-hour period. Here, the analyst can run the model for key hour 
periods during the day/week/season and gross-up the estimates to give weekly or 
annual totals. With relatively minor changes to the source code, the model can be set 
up to cover any time period desired. A key requirement of the model is that it should 
be able to predict year round profitability. Applications of the model should therefore 
take account of seasonality. 
 
 
 
 
The cost model 
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On the cost side, we have used an approach similar to the CIPFA fully-allocated costs 
method which relates costs to vehicle hours, vehicle miles and the peak vehicle 
requirement. While this is not perfect from an economist’s perspective, it is 
essentially the approach used  by operators in determining how much various aspects 
of their operations cost and thus is a sound basis for mimicing operators’ decisions. 
 
The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) developed a 
fully allocated cost formula for the National Bus Company in 1974 (CIPFA, 1974). 
The formula attempts to allocate variable, semi-variable and fixed costs to measures 
of physical output, and identifies three measures of physical output to which costs can 
be allocated: 
 
(i) Fuel, oil and tyre costs were allocated on the basis of distance operated, that is 
they were allocated according to vehicle kilometres (VKM); 
(ii) Staff costs and vehicle maintenance costs were allocated on the basis of time 
operated, that is they were allocated according to vehicle hours (VH); 
(iii) Vehicle depreciation and building costs were allocated according to peak 
vehicles (V). 
 
An example of the fully allocated costing approach is given below. As can be seen, 
total costs are a linear function of VH, VM and V, with average cost (in terms of 
vehicle miles) being inversely proportional to speed (VKM/VH) and vehicle 
utilisation (VKM/V) which is itself determined by the peakiness of the operation. 
 
cVbVKMaVHTC ++=          
 
From DETR (2000) we have established that for an average vehicle in 1999, a=£16.41 
per vehicle hour, b=£0.091 per vehicle km, and c=£15.16 per vehicle. To more 
accurately reflect costs it will be sensible to develop the model to reflect different 
vehicle types (mini, midi, single deck, double deck, low floor), different local 
operating conditions and different levels of quality (QBP and non-QBP traffic). 
Passenger Infrastructure Costs 
 
Passenger infrastructure costs can vary considerably across QBP types, a reflection of 
both the diversity of the road systems covered by QBP areas and the passenger 
infrastructure elements that are included in a QBP. Given this it is impossible to 
arrive at a universal average cost figure for QBPs, nor is it possible to report an 
average figure for similar types of QBPs (for example, those with high quality 
infrastructure), e.g. the average kilometre cost of the Line 33 QBP in Birmingham is 
around £150k, whilst in Edinburgh the cost per kilometre of Greenways is around 
£310k. What are therefore required are some detailed costs of specific attributes. At a 
recent QBP Conference organised by TAS (June, 2000), Clive Evans from CENTRO 
outlined some specific costs (2000 prices) associated with some QBPs: 
 
• £8k to provide a Kassel kerb and paving at a bus stop; 
• Driver training at £200 each; 
• £6.2k for real time information at each bus stop; and  
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• £4.5 for a high specification QBP bus shelter. 
 
The demand model 
 
On the demand side, we assume the individual to be the decision-making unit and that 
all decisions are taken at point of sale. Using decision rules based on utility 
maximising, a given individual has to consider: 
 
• whether or not to make the journey, and 
• which mode to use. 
 
We call this a ‘level 2’ or upper-level decision.  If the individual chooses to make a 
journey and travel by bus, the following additional considerations are of interest: 
 
• which stop to board and alight (if available), 
• which operator to travel with (if available),  
• which service to use (time of departure), and  
• which ticket type to use. 
 
We call this a ‘level 1’ or lower level decision. Note that, although for analytical and 
modelling convenience we have structured the problem hierarchically, this does NOT 
mean that individuals are assumed to take decisions in this way. This two-stage 
process allows for the allocation of passengers between operators and also allows for 
the overall size of the bus market to expand or contract as service levels change. 
Choice of Service (level 1) 
 
For a given individual (i) travelling between a given OD pair, the choice between 
available services is modelled as a function of the generalised cost of travel for each 
service (s). Here, generalised cost is represented by the fare paid plus a cost attribute 
vector, comprising in-vehicle time, adjustment time, ticket flexibility, and operator 
quality.  
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where fare is taken to be average fare per trip, 
x
C  is cost attribute x  (e.g. in-vehicle 
time), and 
x
α  is its associated monetary value (e.g. value of time).  
 
By making some assumptions about the distribution of bus user characteristics (child, 
adult, pensioner) and their most desired departure times, we can derive the probability 
that an individual will choose a particular service (Pis) by way of a multinomial logit 
model: 
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where θ1  is the spread parameter that governs the sensitivity of choice to changes in 
generalised cost. As the value of θ1  approaches zero, market share is split equally 
between all S options whereas as the value of θ1  increases, the market share of the 
option with the lowest generalised cost tends to one. The value of θ1  therefore 
determines the cross elasticity between services.  
 
The market share for each service (route, departure-time, operator and ticket type) is 
taken as the average probability of using each service over all simulated individuals. 
 
Choice of Mode (level 2) 
 
The upper level of the model is concerned with mode choice and therefore the overall 
size of the bus market. This decision is modelled by way of an incremental logit 
model and is based on the overall attractiveness of bus services relative to other 
modes and not travelling at all.  
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2θ  is a structural coefficient (0< 2θ <1) 
 
Here 2θ  governs the sensitivity of individuals to changes in the level of bus services 
offered and is determined by the elasticity of demand for bus travel. We have chosen 
to use an incremental logit at this level so we can hold factors external to the bus 
market constant during the modelling process. This model pivots around existing 
market shares as a function of changes in the overall level of service and fares in the 
bus market ( bV∆ ). 
 
 
From the description of the demand model presented above, it is clear that there are 
three elements needed for model calibration. Firstly, evidence is needed on 
passengers’ monetary valuation of bus journey attributes, for example, their value of 
time. Secondly, evidence is needed on the sensitivity of travellers to changes in 
generalised cost (or an element of generalised cost) between services. We therefore 
need information on cross elasticities between services to determine the θ1 spread 
parameter. Finally, evidence on the overall sensitivity of the market with regard to 
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changes in generalised cost (or elements of generalised costs) is needed to determine 
the θ2 structural parameter. This information will come from well-documented 
evidence on fare elasticities.  However, there are some theoretical relationships 
between these parameters and the elasticities which can help us to reduce the 
information requirements and, at the same time, ensure internal consistency (Taplin, 
1982; Toner, 1993). It is to the these we turn in the following section.. 
 
The model outlined above produces snap shots of company profits (revenue minus 
costs) under different operating assumptions. There is also an evaluation module 
which estimates changes in consumers’ surplus. At the moment, this uses the rule-of-
a-half, though this may change in the future. Thus, by adjusting the input parameters 
and the assumptions about competitive behaviour, the outcomes under different 
scenarios can be tested, including: 
 
two  operators matching frequencies; 
unequal frequencies but both in scheme; 
unequal frequencies and not all in scheme; 
fares competition.  
 
As a result of this, we are able to assess whether market entry is any of: (a) feasible; 
(b) sustainable; and/or (c) desirable and thus whether Quality Bus Partnerships can 
yield the advantages claimed for them for the main parties concerned – users, local 
authorities and operators. 
 
 
Internal demand elasticity relationships 
 
In general, we will refer to  ij as the ordinary (or Marshallian) elasticity of demand for 
good i with respect to the price of good j.  The effect on demand of a price change as 
represented by such an elasticity comprises a substitution effect and an income effect. 
These are the elasticities most commonly estimated in practice by analysts studying 
demand for particular goods. 
 
There are two key properties of systems of demand equations which we use: the 
homogeneity condition; and the symmetry condition (see, for example, Silberberg, 1978).  
It is possible to use these rules in a restricted system to estimate relevant elasticities with 
only partial information (Toner, 1993). Using h to denote compensated elasticities, it is 
easy to show that there is a direct relationship between pairs of cross elasticities: 
 
pixihij = pjxjhji 
 
In the case where we use ordinary (Marshallian) elasticities, there needs to be an 
adjustment to take account of the income effects. The relationship between compensated 
elasticities (denoted h) and Marshallian elasticities (denoted ) is given by: 
 
ij + jiY = hij  where j is the share of income spent on good j and  iY is the income 
elasticity of demand for i. 
 
So, using Marshallian elasticities and rearranging, we have  
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iij = jji + ij(jY - iY) 
 
Thus if the income elasticities for i and j are the same, there is still a directly symmetrical 
relationship between the cross elasticities. Even if this is not the case, if the proportion of 
income spent on i and j is small (say 10% on each) then the adjustment is only 0.01 times 
the difference in income elasticities. 
 
So far, so good.  Now, suppose that goods i and j are bus trips by two different operators 
(or, indeed, two services of the same operator). It is clearly too much to consider the 
relationship between these and every other commodity, but it is possible to construct a 
theoretical composite good “everything else” and still make the homogeneity and 
symmetry conditions hold.  So, denoting the composite good by the subscript e, we have 
 
ii + ij + ie + iY = 0 
ji + jj + je + jY = 0 
ei + ej + ee + eY = 0 
 
and this fully describes our system.  The quantity of composite good is defined in any 
units required; for convenience, it  can be defined as expenditure on all goods other than i 
or j and with price of unity.  
 
We now introduce the concept of a conditional elasticity.  London Transport, as a multi-
mode operator, is often interested not just in the pure own-price elasticities of demand for 
bus or underground, but in a combined “what happens to bus demand when bus and 
underground fares rise?” and similarly for underground demand.  This joint effect, or 
conditional elasticity  (henceforth C.E.), is the sum of (for bus) the own-price elasticity of 
demand for bus and the cross-price elasticity of demand for bus with respect to the price 
of underground.  
 
In our case, we are quite clear what happens to the overall demand for bus when the price 
changes – at least in the short run – but much less so what happens when, say, there are 
two competing bus companies or two different services of one operator and we have to 
decide what happens to demand on one of them when its price changes but that of the 
other service does not.  However, our system above allows us to make some 
simplifications: 
 
The first equation rearranges to: ii + ij = -ie - iY  of which the LHS is definitionally the 
conditional elasticity of demand for operator i when all operators (i,j) change prices by an 
equiproportionate amount.   
 
Likewise, the second equation of the system rearranges to:  ji + jj = -je - jY  where 
similarly the LHS is the conditional elasticity of demand for j. 
 
Four unknowns in two equations is rather more than satisfactory; but assuming weak 
separability of the utility function reduces this.  If we assume weak separability, then 
there is a relationship between the elasticity of demand for good i with respect to the 
price of the composite good e and the income elasticity of demand for good i of the form: 
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ie =  iY   and similarly  je = jY  
 
We can thus express the C.E. for a good in terms of its income elasticity: 
 
C.E.i = ii + ij = -(1+ )iY ;   and 
C.E.j = ji + jj = -(1+ )jY  
 
such that the difference between conditional elasticities is a function of the difference 
between income elasticities.  A corollary is that Conditional Elasticities are the same if 
and only if income elasticities are the same. 
 
In practice, any difference between income elasticities is likely to have very little effect 
on the conditional elasticities.  Consider again 
 
C.E.i = ii + ij   =  ii + (jji / i ) + j(jY - iY) 
 
where  is the share of total expenditure.  For bus travel, this is small: even for regular 
bus users on low incomes it is unlikely to exceed say 4% of income which means that  
even for a difference in income elasticities of 0.5,  then the last term of the above 
expression might be at most 0.02 and this in the context of anticipated condiitonal 
elasticities of at least –0.4.  Given the imprecision with which elasticities are known, we 
think it unlikely that any real difference between income elasticities for different 
operators, or equivalently any difference in conditional elasticities between operators, 
can be substantiated.   
 
If we assume that all operators face the same conditional elasticity  and we know what 
that elasticity is  (for example, C.E.= –0.4) then we have a system of two equations in 
four unknowns, ie 
 
ii + ij  = -0.4 
ji + jj  = -0.4 
 
However, the symmetry condition implies a relationship between the cross elasticities, so 
we actually have two equations in three unknowns.  There is therefore just one degree of 
freedom, that is one parameter to be decided upon, which, used in conjunction with 
known prices, market shares &c., means just one piece of external evidence to determine 
the whole consistent system once a conditional elasticity has been specified. 
Unfortunately, little is known about any of the relevant parameters; but we can simplify 
the information requirements further by specifiying the cross elasticities in terms of 
diverison factors. 
  
A diversion factor ji is defined as the proportion of those who, ceasing to use mode j 
consequent upon some deterioration in j, move to mode i.  Clearly the sum over all 
alternatives diffreent from j (including not travelling) must be unity.  It  is then possible 
to define a cross-elaslasticity 
 ij  as: 
 
δεε ji
i
j
jjij  
s
s
  = −  
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Suppose 75% of those who transfer from bus when the price of bus rises switch to car. 
That would give, in the above example, a cross-elasticity of 0.12.  We can perform a 
similar operation for the elasticity of demand for train with respect to the price of bus. 
For a recent in-depth application of this procedure, see Bejarano (1999). 
 
In our case of  two bus operators and a composite good, exactly the same approach can 
be used, since the composite is an artificial construct and it is the relative market shares 
of the two bus services, not the absolutes, which are relevant in determining cross-
elasticities. A further advantage is that we can incorporate generation effects; if 90% of 
those who cease to use service i when its price rises go to j then, given our three good 
system, the other 10% must be suppressed (= negative generated) traffic (at least as far as  
that bus operator is concerned).  The diversion factors will depend on how good a 
substitute the two bus services are for each other and, of course, need not be symmetric; 
in fact, chances are they won’t be. 
Combining the two approaches 
 
On the assumption of identical conditional elasticities, we have CEi = ii + ij = ji + jj   = 
CEj 
 
From the diversion factor approach, we have ij expressed in terms of jj  and ji expressed 
in terms of ii.  Thus 
 
ji = – iiij(si/sj)   and  ij = – iiij(pj/pi)  
 
From the symmetry condition, it is possible to show that, for identical income elasticities 
and with identical prices, 
 
CEi = ii + ij = ii(1-ij) and CEj = jj + ji  = jj(1-ji)   
 
The equivalent results where the two goods have different prices are: 
 
CEi = ii + ij = ii(1-(pj/pi)ij) and CEj = jj + ji  = jj(1-(pi/pj)ji)   
 
Combining all these, we can obtain a relationship between the two diversion factors 
so that, on the assumption of identical conditional elasticities (equivalently, identical 
income elasticities) of demand for bus, there is only one degree of freedom – ie one 
diversion factor can be freely estimated given observed market shares and relative 
prices.  Everything else falls out of the system. 
 
In particular, 
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Example 
 
Suppose operator i has 80% of the market and operator j has the remaining 20%.  
Suppose also that ij = 0.3, that is if the majority operator increases fares, 30% of those 
who stop using I will use j’s buses and the rest will find something else to do.  This is 
perhaps reasonable because, with a lesser coverage of the area ( in time or space, it does 
not matter), j’s buses are not particularly good substitutes for i’s buses.  We also assume 
conditional elasticities of –0.4 and that the prices charged are the same. 
 
Given ij = 0.3,  si = 0.8 and sj = 0.2,  
 
 ii(1- 0.3) = -0.4 , or ii = -4/7; 
 
 ji = -ii ij (si/sj) = 0.686 or 24/35 
 
 ij = ji (sj/si) = 0.171 or 6/35 
 
 jj = -0.4 – ji = -1.06 or –38/35 
 
 ji =  0.63 or 12/19.     
 
Now suppose that the minority operator 2 charges fares at 90% of the level of the big 
operator but that ij = 0.3,  si = 0.8 and sj = 0.2 still.  Then 
 
 ii(1-0.9*0.3) = -0.4 , or ii = -40/73 
 
 ji = -ii ij (si/sj) = 0.658 or 48/73 
 
 ij = ji (pjsj/pisi) = 0.148 or 10.8/73 
 
 jj = -0.4 – ji = -1.06 or –77.2/73 
 
 ji =  0.56 or 108/193.     
 
This accords with intuition; ji is a measure of how close a substitute the majority 
operator’s service (i) is for that of the minority operator and should be bigger than ij.  In 
fact, the diversion factors are only obviously equal for equal market shares and equal 
prices.  Once the minority operator has lower fares, then the majority operator’s services 
are less good substitutes ceteris paribus.  
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Transforming “ordinary” elasticities into logit elasticities 
 
This part draws heavily on Taplin (1982).  In the first instance, we use equal prices for 
the two operators. 
 
If: 
 
E is a matrix of ordinary own- and cross-price elasticities 
 
S is a matrix of market shares consisting of a row vector (s1, s2,…,sn) repeated n times (so 
that column i is a column of si’s) 
 
I is the identity matrix,  
 
then the matrix of mode share elasticities, M , is given by: 
 
M = (I – S) E  
 
It is then merely mechanical to derive from the matrix of ordinary elasticities 
 
 
E =  (-0.57 0.17 ) 
 (0.69 -1.09) 
 
the corresponding mode share (or logit) elasticities 
 
M = (-0.25 0.25 ) 
 (1.01 -1.01) 
 
The difference between the ordinary and the mode share elasticities is constant in each 
column; -0.32 for column 1 and -0.08 for column 2.  Aggregated, these should yield the 
common conditional elasticity –0.4, which they do.  What this says is that for a 10% 
increase in both bus prices, overall demand falls 4% and of that 4% total, 3.2% is 
suffered by operator 1 and 0.8% by operator 2 that is, in proportion to their existing 
market shares of 80:20. 
 
Similary with unequal prices, 
 
E =  (-0.548 0.148 ) 
 (0.658 -1.058) 
 
and the corresponding mode share (or logit) elasticities are 
 
M = (-0.24 0.24   ) 
 (0.964 -0.964) 
 
Again, the difference between the ordinary and the mode share elasticities is constant in 
each column; -0.307 for column 1 and -0.093 for column 2.  Aggregated, these yield the 
common conditional elasticity –0.4.  For a 10% decrease in both bus prices, overall 
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demand rises 4% and of that 4% total, 3.07% is gained by operator 1 and 0.93% by 
operator 2.  In other words, once we have differential prices, the generated traffic is not 
allocated in proportion to existing shares; instead, the cheaper operator gets more than its 
“fair share” of the growth.     
 
The conditional elasticity is what we use to scale 2, the upper level structural parameter. 
 
We generate 1, the lower level structural parameter, as follows: 
 
Recall that logit price elasticities (denoted m) are defined as: 
 
mii = pi(1 – si)   and mji = - pi si  for a linear additive utility function  (and similarly for 
j) 
 
(Note that to use generalised cost, we just specify (p + v1t1 + v2t2 + …) .) 
 
Then  is given by  -mji / pi si.  Suppose in our uniform price example the price was 100p.  
Then  = -0.01257 
 
For the differential price case, we have two operator-specific ’s.  This means that we 
will have different coefficients for the two operators in the logit model, =-0.01205 for 
the higher fare operator and =-0.01339 for the low fare operator. 
 
Note that the logit elasticity (ie the inter-operator mode share elasticity) is not a constant 
multiple of the conditional elasticity; the relationship varies according to the relative 
market shares.  
 
Using the theory 
 
What follows is for illustrative purposes.  In the model, we can use different elasticities 
and values of time for the different time periods, viz peak, inter-peak, evening, Saturday, 
Sunday.  
 
For the consumer, the decision is travel by bus or not travel by bus.  If s/he decides to 
travel by bus, s/he then has to decide which bus to catch.  The previous subsections of 
section 8 have dealt exclusively with this latter decision. 
 
Assume we have the case as above with conditional elasticities of –0.4, market shares of 
80/20 for operators A and B, a diversion factor AB= 0.3 and A and B charging 100p and 
90p respectively.   Then, we have established A = -0.01205   and B= -0.01339.  The 
coefficient on any other variable is simply the monetary value of the variable (in pence 
per relevant unit) times .  So if the value of in-vehicle time is 2p/minute and the value of 
waiting time is 3p/minute, the coefficients are –0.0241 on IVT and –0.03615 on wait for 
operator A and –0.02678 on IVT and –0.04017 on wait for operator B.  This gives utility 
functions 
 
VA = ASCA - 0.01205*FAREA – 0.0241*IVTA – 0.03615*WAITA 
VB = -0.01339*FAREB – 0.02678*IVTB – 0.04017*WAITB 
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The ASCA is adjusted to bring the market shares from the logit model into line with 
observed market shares once fares, IVT and waiting times have been entered. 
 
We turn now to the bus/not bus decision.  This is based on the utility of travelling by bus, 
VT as against the utility of not travelling by bus, VN. 
 
VN = k 
VT =  log (exp (VA) + exp(VB)) 
 
and parameters  and k are jointly and uniquely determined so as to (i) replicate the 
existing bus market share and (ii) ensure that if all bus operators increase their fares by 
the same infinitessimally small percentage, the bus market share changes in accordance 
with the conditional elasticity of demand for bus. 
 
We are now in a position to assess the effects of various quality measures. Suppose it is 
proposed to introduce real-time information, valued at 9p/trip, low-floor buses at 3p/trip 
and nice bus shelters at 6.5p/trip.  If all operators participate in the scheme, the 
improvement in utility of bus A is (9+3+6.5)*0.01205 = 0.222925 and for bus B 
(9+3+6.5)*0.01339 = 0.247715.  Adding these constants into VA and VB will improve the 
overall utility of travelling by bus, VT,  and we will have new mode shares for bus 
compared with not travelling by bus and new shares for each operator.  If only operator A 
participates, then only VA is increased.  This will both increase the overall share of bus 
and increase A’s share of the bus market.  
 
 coeffA attA coeffB attB  condel 
fare  -0.01205 100 -0.01339 90  -0.4 
ivt -0.0241 15 -0.02678 15   
wait -0.03615 5 -0.04017 15   
ASC  0.9242     
QUAL:  0  0   
  0.43909  0.109772  
       
 bus shares 0.800001 0.199999  
 expEMU 0.75253  mu 0.47393  
 UN 1.755901 k 1.187901 
   
0.3 shares 0.7  
   BUS  NOTBUS  
 
In the above spreadsheet, the coefficients are as derived earlier and some travel and 
waiting times have been assumed.  An ASC of 0.9242 has been chosen to bring the 
forecast operator shares of 80% for A and 20% for B. 
 
The parameters  and k have been chosen to ensure a conditional elasticity (condel) of –
0.4  and an observed overall bus market share of, say 30% in the current situation.  We 
can now assess the effects of quality measures. 
 
If both operators participate in a QBP, then each has the utility of its service increased 
and the effects are as below: 
 
 coeffA attA coeffB attB  
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fare  -0.01205 100 -0.01339 90  
ivt -0.0241 15 -0.02678 15  
wait -0.03615 5 -0.04017 15  
ASC  0.9242    
QUAL:  0.222925 0.247715 
  0.548743 0.140628 
      
 bus shares 0.796005 0.203995 
 expEMU 0.838375 mu 0.47393 
 UN 1.755901 k 1.187901 
   
0.323163 shares 0.676837 
   BUS  NOTBUS 
 
The overall bus share is now 32.3%, a growth of 7.7% relative to the base. Each operator 
has roughly the same share as before, though B has improved its position slightly.  If just 
operator A participates in the QBP, the effects are to grow the overall market (now 
31.8% is the share which bus has) and operator A has an increased share, 83.3%, of that 
larger market.  A has both taken traffic from B and taken traffic from other 
modes/generated trips.  A actually has more trips in this case than when B participates in 
the QBP! Thus, although it is in B’s interest and in the public interest for all operators to 
participate, it is in the larger operator’s interest to be the sole Quality operator. 
 
 coeffA attA coeffB attB  
fare  -0.01205 100 -0.01339 90  
ivt -0.0241 15 -0.02678 15  
wait -0.03615 5 -0.04017 15  
ASC  0.9242    
QUAL:  0.222925 0  
  0.548743 0.109772 
      
 bus shares 0.833304 0.166696 
 expEMU 0.820376 mu 0.47393 
 UN 1.755901 k 1.187901 
   
0.318435 shares 0.681565 
   BUS  NOTBUS 
  
The full model is, of course, rather more complex than this, but this shows the essentials 
of how the parameters are derived and how the effects of a QBP are assessed.  
 
 
An application of the model 
 
The model was initially validated on simulated data for a hypothetical bus route. 
However, more recently, we have been able to validate the model on real data. We 
now describe a series of model runs for looking at the introduction of quality and 
subsequent entry into the market by a second operator. It is intended that this case 
study is viewed as a demonstration of some of the capabilities of the model, rather 
than an in-depth analysis of the potential for QBPs. 
 
Description of the case Network 
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Briefly, the route is 18.5km long incorporating 25 bus stops. The route is currently 
supplied by a single operator for most of its length, who operates a more or less 
uniform frequency of 4 buses per hour, between 6am and 6pm. The services are 
essentially inter-urban commuter services serving the outlying regions of a mid-sized 
British city. Within the city limits, the service faces on street competition. The data 
supplied shows the daily (6am to 6pm) demand for services from Monday to Friday in 
late July 1999 at approximately 1170 passengers. If all passengers pay full fare (i.e. 
assume that the difference between concessionary and full fares is made up by the 
local authority) and the average fare on the route is £1.09, the incumbent generates 
base daily revenue of £1280.40. There are a total of 1628 bus kilometres in the 
timetable and if each is costed at an average of £0.79, then we estimate total costs at 
£1286.12 and daily profits of £-6.20. For this time period, the incumbent is shown to 
more or less breakeven on this route, though we suspect that late July is not a typical 
operating period and that increased profits will be made at other times in the year. 
That said, we believe that this is a solid base to examine the impact of QBP. 
 
Modelled Scenarios 
 
We have chosen to look at the impacts of the introduction of a QBP using a scenario-
based approach. In the first instance we look at the impact of a QBP on a monopoly 
supplier and assess whether the investment can be justified on increased revenues or 
whether a wider social cost benefit analysis in needed to justify investment. 
Following this, we use the model to look at the impact of new market entry and assess 
imnpact on operators and consumers of alternative competitive strategies based on 
fares, service levels and service quality.  
How does a QBP impact on the monopoly supplier? 
 
Table 1 shows the annual demand and revenue implications of an increase in service 
quality for a monopoly operator. Quality enhancements valued at 5 pence per trip (say 
the provision of real time information) leads to a 2.2% increase in demand and a 
corresponding increase in revenue of £8,100. Assuming that the QBP has no cost or 
capacity implications for the operator, profitability is set to rise by £8,100 annually. 
Not surprisingly, consumers benefit from the increase in quality, with their net gain 
valued at £18,540 annually. Combining both operator profitability and consumer 
surplus gives a measure of benefit to society as a whole - excluding the capital and 
operating costs of the QBP investment, this benefit is valued at £26,640 annually. 
Additional model runs have been made for more significant increases in quality and 
these results are shown also.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Demand implications of a QBP for a monopolist 
 
Quality Increase
d 
Demand 
% 
Growth 
in 
Demand 
Increase 
in 
Revenue 
Increase 
in Profit 
Change 
in CS 
Change 
in 
Welfare 
5 pence per trip 7632 2.2 £8,100 £8,100 £18,540 £26,640 
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10 pence per trip 15300 4.4 £16,272 £16,272 £37,440 £53,712 
15 pence per trip 23148 6.6 £24,696 £24,696 £56,772 £81,504 
20 pence per trip 31104 8.9 £33,300 £33,336 £76,536 £109,872 
Assumes 6am to 6pm operation for a 300 day year. 
 
As well as improving bus quality, improvements to journey times and frequencies 
could also be assessed using this model together with complications such as second 
round effects on capacity requirement and demand levels. It is therefore quite easy to 
see how this model could be used to assess investment possibilities in a single 
operator case.  
 
A Framework for Assessing Competition 
 
If the increase in demand brought about though the introduction of a QBP is sufficient to 
trigger new entry into the market, then we need a methodological framework to be used 
to assess competition. In the short run, we have specified a series of plausible 
competitive scenarios rather than define a set of supply side algorithms that lead 
model convergence at an equilibrium. The competitive strategies available to each 
agent include those based on: pricing, quantity, service quality and cost reduction. 
The costs and benefits associated with each scenario are then compared with base 
statistics for operator profitability, consumer surplus and overall economic welfare.  
 
The base case is a single operator not in a QBP scheme. There are four levels of 
quality improvement worth 5p, 10p, 15p and 20p respectively to the consumer which 
can used by both operators, that is each operator can decide the extent to which, if at 
all, they participate in the scheme.  The incumbent operator is assumed to maintain 
fares and services at current levels, whereas it is assumed the entrant may take on a 
range of strategies. In the long run, we will also test a range of incumbent responses 
to entry.  
 
To simplify presentation, the outcome of all tested scenarios have been analysed by a 
series of dummy variable regression runs with operator profitability and changes in 
consumer surplus and economic welfare taken as the dependent variables and the 
incumbent’s and entrant’s levels of quality and the entrant’s price and frequency 
strategies taken as the independent variables. Each model is calibrated on output data 
derived from 485 simulation runs. The coefficients tell us the average effect  of each 
element of strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Regression Analysis on Operator Profitability, Consumer Surplus 
and Welfare - £ per day (t-stats shown in brackets) 
           Dep 
Variable 
 
Variable 
Incumbent Profit 
Model (a) 
Change in CS 
Model (b) 
Change in 
Welfare 
Model (c) 
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 Constant -72.05 (4.9) 46.23 (3.2) 54.63 (4.2) 
ASC 5 -Incumbent 58.25 (8.5) 39.13 (5.7) 61.80 (9.9) 
ASC 10 –
Incumbent 119.03 (17.9) 78.86 (11.9) 124.82 (20.7) 
ASC 15 –
Incumbent 181.35 (27.7) 119.76 (18.4) 189.50 (31.9) 
ASC 20 –
Incumbent 245.15 (37.4) 162.03 (24.8) 256.32 (43.3) 
10% Fares 
Discount -123.94 (30.9) 51.53 (12.9) 21.52 (5.9) 
20% Fares 
Discount -254.48 (63.6) 119.44 (29.9) 35.45 (9.8) 
30% Fares 
Discount -379.63 (94.9) 204.94 (51.5) 42.24 (11.7) 
1 Service per hour -69.81 (4.8) -11.85 (0.8) -336.19 (25.5) 
2 Service per hour -266.11 (18.4) 74.10 (5.2) -583.96 (44.4) 
3 Service per hour -439.31 (30.3) 156.09 (10.8) -832.15 (63.2) 
4 Service per hour -559.37 (38.6) 239.77 (16.6) -1066.99 (81.0) 
ASC 5 – Entrant -45.22 (11.7) 27.48 (7.1) 31.02 (8.8) 
ASC 10 – Entrant -91.72 (21.2) 56.34 (13.1) 63.76 (16.3) 
ASC 15 – Entrant -139.14 (27.6) 86.50 (17.3) 98.20 (21.6) 
ASC 20 – Entrant -187.51 (28.3) 117.97 (17.8) 134.32 (22.4) 
Cost [0,-10%] na na 87.69 (34.3) 
Adj R2 0.98467 0.95668 0.99141 
Observations 485 485 485 
 
Model (a) Incumbent Profitability 
The constant shows a base daily operating loss of £72.05 for the incumbent operating 
without quality enhancements. Subsequent improvements in quality, valued at 
increments of five pence per trip, generate an increase in profitability of £58.25, 
£119.03, £181.35 and £245.15. Entry into the market by a second operator 
progressively reduces the incumbents profitability as the entrant’s service levels 
increase, fare levels reduce and quality improves, for example a new entrant operating 
4 buses per hour, with a 30% fares discount and a high level of quality will reduce the 
incumbent’s profitability by  £1126.51 per day if the incumbent does nothing. This 
level of entry is, in fact, not sustainable as it requires the entrant to absorb significant 
operating losses. From the incumbent’s perspective, an increased quality of service 
maintains a modest level of profitability even with some fringe competition, though it 
is likely that the incumbent would increase frequency to blockade entry. For example, 
an entrant offering one bus an hour with a 10% fare discount but not in the quality 
scheme would reduce the incumbent’s profits by £193.75 on average. However, were 
the incumbent to take part in a QBP scheme worth 20p per passenger, it could 
increase its profits by £245.15. 
 
Model (b) Change in Consumer Surplus  
Model (b) shows the results of an increase in competition on the welfare of 
consumers. As would be expected, consumers benefit as quality is improved, service 
levels increased and fares reduced.  Taking the case above of an entrant coming in 
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with 4 buses an hour, offering a 30% discount on the incumbent’s fares and 
participating in the scheme while the incumbent does nothing, the increase in 
consumer surplus is £562.68. 
 
Model (c) Change in Welfare  
The change in overall economic welfare brought about if competition occurs is by-
and-large strongly welfare negative. The dominant impact here is the reduction in 
operator profitability brought about as a result of entry. Here, welfare is taken to be 
the sum of profits from both operators together with consumer surplus. It is clear from 
this analysis that this route can not support two profitable operators unless the 
incumbent operator were to reduce its frequency or the overall size of the market were 
to grow significantly.  Using the same example, overall social surplus would reduce 
by £890.43, made up of gains to consumers of £562.68, losses to the incumbent of 
£1126.51 and losses to the entrant of £326.60.  On this route, it would seem that entry 
is a socially undesirable leading to wasteful competition unless there is a reduction of 
service by the incumbent. Of course, in the longer run, the overall market elasticity is 
sufficient for fares increases to improve profitability; the question is whether the 
dynamics of competition would permit this.   
 
Case Study Conclusions 
 
The situation described assumes that both operators act independently of each other 
and that the cross elasticities of demand between services are high. In fact, if 
operators were to collude or the cross elasticities of demand are lower that assumed, 
the best strategy for each firm would be to price high and produce low. This strategy 
would be justified on the basis that the overall market elasticities on the route are low. 
Unless the market can grow significantly, or the incumbent reduce output levels, this 
route is unlikely to support two operators and although consumers would benefit from 
competition, society as a whole would suffer welfare losses.  It remains for us to find 
market conditions and competitve behaviour which could enhace social welfare. 
 
 
Overall Conclusions 
 
We have demonstrated the capabilities of a model to evaluate the benefits of a Quality 
Bus Partnership scheme under various assumptions about the number of operators and 
the competitive strategies they may adopt.  As part of this, we have developed a method 
of ensuring that the input data on elasticities, which drive the parameters of the demand 
model, are consistent with up to date external evidence and are internally consistent. A 
number of challenges remain: 
 
• to test the model with different conditional and operator specific elasticities; 
 
• to test the model with different consumer responses to quality and frequency 
improvements, including more robust evaluation of consumers’ willingness to 
pay for quality improvements; 
 
• to develop the appraisal capabilities of the model, in particular the attribution 
of costs and benefits for consumers with heterogeneous tastes;  
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• . 
• to explore possible operator responses and strategies for competition,  possibly 
within the QBP, for example, timetable response; 
 
• there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that long run elasticities are 
higher than short run elasticities.  We couldconsider ways of making the 
model dynamic; 
 
• at present the model tests scenarios, it could be developed as an optimisation 
model (using profit maximisation or forms of social welfare function).  In this 
case we might need a less detailed specification of the route. 
 
Wait for the next version in two years’ time… 
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